Religion-State Connections and US-Muslim Counter-Terrorism Cooperation

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Beginning in the 1990s, the United States began pressing Muslim states to increase their counterterrorism efforts in response to the emergence of al-Qaeda, a global terrorist network targeting the United States and US interests abroad. This intensified greatly after the attacks of September 11, 2001, as the United States launched a worldwide effort to disrupt the al-Qaeda network—which perpetrated the attacks—and reform political systems in the “Muslim world” to prevent similar violent movements from arising. This “global war on terror” involved heightened pressure on US-aligned Muslim states to cooperate with US counterterrorism efforts and take steps against terrorist groups and their supporters. And the effort took on a religious salience, due to al-Qaeda’s religious ideology and the perceptions among many Muslims that US counterterrorism efforts constituted an attack on Islam. Most Muslim states cooperated to some extent with the United States, but they also hesitated in a variety of manners when faced with US pressure on counterterrorism, leading to some tensions with the United States.

What explains this variation in Muslim countries’ counterterrorism cooperation, and what role did religion play in this variation? Did tensions between the United States and Muslim states over counterterrorism represent a “civilizational” clash? Or was religious contention in Muslim states secondary in importance to non-religious domestic factors or a state’s dependence on the United States? This touches on a broader theoretical question: under what conditions does religion influence a state’s international behavior, especially in a high-stakes issue such as counterterrorism?

I argue that religious contention in Muslim states’ affects counterterrorism cooperation when it occurs in the context of a close religion-state relationship. Religious contention is important, but it is the relationship between religion and state that channels the contention into effects on state behavior. Muslim states have adopted various types of religion-state ties over the
past few decades. When the United States began pressuring them on counterterrorism initiatives, those states with closer ties to religious groups were less likely to fully cooperate due to the greater power of religious groups and symbols in these states. In this way, religious politics contributed to tensions between the United States and Muslim states over counterterrorism, although it did so in a subtle manner, which was often not intended by either regimes or religious groups.

I test this with a mixed-methods analysis. This includes a quantitative analysis of religion-state relations in Muslim countries and US-Muslim counterterrorism cooperation, using an original dataset. I run a time-series regression on the relationship between religion-state relations and a Muslim country’s cooperation with the United States from the mid-1990s until 2009, controlling for alternative explanations, such as diplomatic and economic ties to the United States, regime type, state strength, and domestic terrorism severity. It also includes case studies of Pakistan and Turkey.

This paper contributes to several substantive and theoretical debates in international relations. Theoretically, it contributes to work on religion and international relations by specifying the conditions under which religion affects foreign policy in a specific area, and demonstrating that religion can influence even a high stakes security issue like counter-terror cooperation.\(^1\) It also contributes to debates on the nature of US alliance politics, the hierarchical relations that exist between the United States and Muslim countries and the conditions under which domestic contention undermines US influence over other states.

I use Christian Smith’s (Smith 1996) definition of religion as a “system of beliefs and practices oriented towards the sacred or supernatural.” Religious sentiment is the shared religious

\(^1\) See (Wald and Wilcox 2006, Bellin 2008, Philpott 2009)
beliefs among a sub-set of society, which are based on the broader tradition and doctrine: e.g., a certain interpretation of Islamic law. Religious contention is sustained engagement with the state by social groups based in whole or in part on religious sentiment (McAdam, Tarrow et al. 2001). A religious group is an organized pressure group that advocates for changes in state behavior based on its religious sentiment. A religious issue is an issue that has become politicized among religious groups, and religious policies are policies states enact in response to religious contention on an issue. Finally, I often discuss “Muslim states,” which refers to the population—i.e. majority-Muslim—not the ideology of the state.

The paper proceeds in five parts. I first present the general institutional approach to religion and international relations, and apply it to the specific issue of US-Muslim counterterrorism cooperation. I then present the research design of the paper, and the findings and their implications. Finally, I present conclusions.

**The Institutional Approach to Religion and International Relations**

I draw on what I am calling the institutional approach to religion and international relations to analyze the role religion played in US-Muslim counterterrorism cooperation. Because this is a synthesis of a variety of works on religion and politics, rather than a well-established research program, I will first present this general approach before specifically discussing counterterrorism cooperation.

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2 I take a deliberately constructive approach to religion and religious issues. That is, I do not specify *a priori* what issues are likely to become politicized among religious groups, or over what religious groups will contend with the state. Instead, the process through which issues become religiously-salient is often contingent on actors’ decisions and specific contexts. For more, see the discussion on religion and politics in the theoretical section, and the caveats presented in the implications section. (See (Appleby 2000, Asad 2003, Masuzawa 2005, Beyer 2006, Berger 2009, Nexon 2009)

3 It is a synthesis of various recent studies on religion and politics. For examples, see (Philpott 2000, Philpott 2007, Gill 2008, Nexon 2009, Grim and Finke 2010, Toft, Philpott et al. 2011). For expanded discussions and specific examples of the institutional approach to religion and international relations applied to other areas of international relations by this author, see (Henne 2012, Henne Forthcoming)
Religion is not a fixed motivation on behavior; rather it is a set of actions and rhetoric centered on religious symbols. When religious contention occurs, it can dramatically change the nature of politics in a country, by increasing the political salience of religious arguments, intensifying pressure on the state, and enabling transnational influences on domestic politics. But religious contention alone will not change a state’s behavior.\textsuperscript{4} Instead, a close relationship between religion and the state will channel religious contention into effects on a state’s actions. These religion-state relationships are a function of the strength of the state, and the extent of institutional connections between religion and the state.

\textit{Religion and Politics}

I follow other scholars of religion and politics, and approach religion not as a fixed motivation for behavior but rather a discourse that can have significant effects on politics. The effect of religion is not the imposition of fixed elements of doctrine—like “Islamic law”—on society or the direct motivation of political action based on these doctrines; instead, it resembles the infusion of a religiously-grounded common sense into politics (LeVine and Salvatore 2005). That is, religion influences perceptions of appropriate state policies and societal behavior, leads to the questioning of institutions and policies previously “taken for granted,” and intensifies contention over issues that become religiously salient, even if those elements of society influenced by religion do not base their actions on religious texts or theological arguments (Casanova 1994, Salvatore and LeVine 2005, Beyer 2006). This is because religion is not a monolithic tradition driving adherents to impose religious dogma onto politics, but is a “discursive field,” in which, “religious beliefs, experiences and frameworks draw

\footnote{I refer to state behavior generally, in terms of a state adopting religious policies (as defined above), as it would be difficult to specify every type of behavior that religious groups would press the state to adopt or oppose. See the caveats discussion in the implications section for more on this point.}
boundaries…around what constitutes acceptable arguments and beliefs” (Nexon 2011, Snyder 2011).

Religion contention can dramatically alter the nature of contention in a country. Religion changes the terms of political debates, increasing the salience of religious issues and symbols (Casanova 1994, Thomas 2005, Appiah 2008). Religious issues are more likely to catalyze political activity, and groups and leaders begin to appeal to religious standards rather than nationalism or other belief systems in political debates. Religion also intensifies pressure on leaders to act in response to domestic demands (Smith 1996, Rudolph 1997, Dark 2000, Fox and Sandler 2004, Mehta 2008). When religious organizations that had been politically dormant mobilize, it can make it harder for a regime to ignore public demands it changes its behavior. And religion broadens the scope of political activity, bringing transnational influences into domestic politics (Casanova 1994, Casanova 1996, Rudolph 1997, Dark 2000, Carlson and Owens 2003, Fox and Sandler 2004, Thomas 2005). Religious individuals in society advocate on behalf of coreligionists abroad, while the universal scope of most religious traditions

Thus, religious contention in society results in pressure on the state to act in response to this pressure on domestic and international religiously-contentious issues. Religious groups will press the state to codify religious standards as laws or officially sanction a certain religion. Or many religious groups—especially in the contemporary era—will accept the differentiation between religious and political authority, and not attempt to institute religious laws (Casanova 1994). Instead, they may call on the state to increase the ability of religious groups to operate in society, such as by decreasing restrictions on religious practice or more broadly opening the political system. And while much religious contention focuses on local issues, religious groups at times will call on the state to align its foreign policy with religious sentiment, such as not
undertaking actions seen as against religious standards. The transnational nature of religion can also result in domestic and international issues merging; religious groups may pressure the state to act in defense of coreligionists in other countries or to oppose international actions—by other states or international bodies like the United Nations—they see as counter to religious standards.

But religion alone does not change state behavior. Religious groups pressuring a state to adopt religious policies will have little impact if the state easily represses opposition movements. Even absent repression, religious contention may not affect politics if religious groups lack access to the regime, through either elections or elite allies in the regime. And officially secular states may specifically restrict religious activity or support secular groups, further limiting the influence of religious contention.

Instead, it is the relationship between religion and state that results in religious contention changing states’ international behavior. In situations of close religion-state relationships, the regime is dependent on religious groups for support, religious rhetoric is salient in political debates, and religious groups are powerful in society. When an international religious issue arises, the political influence of religion and religious groups will result in leaders taking actions to gain the support of—or avoid attacks from—religious groups. When religion and state are more distant, the regime appeals to secular groups for support, religious rhetoric has little impact on political debates, and religious groups are marginal or actively repressed. In such cases, regimes can ignore contention over religious issues with little cost.

**Varying Religious Effects on State Behavior**

Thus, different religion-state relationships can explain the varying effects of religious contention on states’ international behavior. The religion-state relationship depends on two
factors. The first is the extent of connections between religion and the state. And the second is state strength.

Religion-state connections refers to the plethora of institutions, policies, and legal codes that connect religious groups or traditions to the state. This includes legal frameworks, such as provisions for an official religion in the Constitution, legal codes that defer to religious standards or authorities, or laws based on religious standards. It also involves political ties between the state and religious groups. In democracies this would be the presence of religious groups in the ruling coalition, while in nondemocracies it could be connections between religious groups and the regime or even the administration of the state by religious groups. And political ties can also take the form of active state support for certain religious communities. Finally, religion-state connections can involve state restrictions on religious activities, either of certain religious communities or all of society.

Extensive connections between religion and the state increase the political influence of religious groups and symbols. When religion and state are close, the state appeals to religion to gain support for its behavior, increasing the influence of religious groups (Piscatori 1983, Dawisha 1985, Esposito 1992, Nasr 2001, Blum 2006). Likewise, provisions for an official religion and elite allies in the regime give religious groups numerous channels through which to pressure the state; and active state support for religious groups can increase their strength in society (Tahir-Khelli 1985, Philpott 2000, Grim and Finke 2010). When religion and state are distant, however, the state restricts religious groups’ activities and appeals to secular ideologies

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to justify its behavior, resulting in minimal channels through which religious groups can influence the state.\footnote{This binary distinction admittedly elides much of the variation in religion-state connections see in other measures such as those of the Pew Forum (2012) or Fox (2008). Defining the entire universe of degrees of religion-state connections is outside the scope of this paper, however, and I have an extended discussion of religion-state connections in Muslim states below. See also the discussion of the independent variable in the research design section.}

State strength is a function of the political system—either democratic or nondemocratic—and state capabilities. Strong states, in which the public cannot directly change state behavior and the state has the capability to control societal groups, will be able to ignore domestic pressure. Weak states with open elections will be directly accountable to the public. And weak nondemocratic states—those lacking sufficient capabilities to control society—will lack the strength to resist domestic pressure; leaders may thus satisfy the demands of powerful domestic groups to avoid losing power or adopt some of the public’s demands and establish official routes for public expression, like legislatures (Snyder 1991, Bueno de Mesquita, Smith et al. 2003, Gandhi and Przeworski 2007).

Thus, the strength of the state can determine the extent to which religious contention affects states’ international behavior. Leaders in strong states—often stable authoritarian regimes—may not feel the need to respond to religious contention due to their power over society.\footnote{The exception is when there are significant connections between religion and the state, which will be discussed below.} Leaders in weak states, however, will be more likely to adopt policies in response to religious contention. Democratic leaders with religious constituencies must appeal to them when making decisions, although their need to also appeal to secular elements of society may prevent overly-religious policies from being adopted. And in weak non-democratic states, the regime may be compelled to adopt religiously-influenced policies to maintain the support of these
groups or co-opt opposition groups. These dynamics extend to foreign policy as well, as
democratic leaders will base foreign policies on the demands of voters and weak nondemocratic
states may adopt seemingly erratic foreign policies to satisfy powerful domestic groups or stave

Varying levels of state strength and religion-state connections result in different
categories of religious influence on states’ international behaviors. The strongest is present in
weak states with extensive religion-state connections, as religion will be very salient in such
countries and the state will lack the capabilities to resist domestic religious pressure. Moderate
influence is present in strong states with extensive religion-state connections; the religion-state
connections intensify the political impact of religious contention, yielding some influence, but
the state is better able to control society. Low influence is present in weak states with few
religion-state connections; society is able to affect state behavior—both domestic and
international—but the lack of religion-state connections minimizes the impact of religious
connection. And minimal influence occurs in strong states with few religion-state connections.
(See Figure 1)

[Figure 1 about here]

Thus, based on the institutional approach to religion and international relations, religious
contention affects the nature of politics, buts its influence on state behavior is channeled through
the relationship between religion and the state. When an international religious issue arises, close
religion-state relationships intensify the salience of religious contention, resulting in regimes
adopting policies in line with the contention. Due to the context-dependent nature of religious
contention and religious issues, this approach is by necessity rather general; the next section,
however, applies it to a specific issue, US-Muslim counterterrorism cooperation.
Religion and US-Muslim Counter-terrorism Cooperation

The varying effects of religious contention in Muslim countries on US-Muslim counterterrorism cooperation is a specific instance of the general relationship posited by the institutional theory of religion and international relations. US counterterrorism efforts—directed primarily against Islamic groups since the 1990s—took on a religious salience as many in Muslim countries perceived them as attacks on Islam or Muslims; as a result, it turned into an international religious issue in which domestic groups strongly opposed states’ cooperation with the United States. This occurred in the context of broader religious contention in Muslim countries, as well as a variety of religion-state relationships. Following the institutional approach to religion and international relations, I argue that religious contention affected states’ counterterrorism cooperation through the religion-state relationship; those states with closer religion-state ties were less cooperative with the United States on counterterrorism.

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**US-Muslim Counterterrorism Cooperation**

US attention to terrorist threats began in the 1960s and 1970s and expanded in the 1980s with the creation of the Central Intelligence Agency’s Counterterrorism Center. US concern over terrorism intensified in the 1990s, with the threat to US interests posed by al-Qaeda; this spiked after the terrorist attacks of 9/11, and continued through the Obama administration. A significant portion of US counterterrorism initiatives involved Muslim states. This included pressure on Muslim states to take action against terrorist groups, terrorist financing, and extremist rhetoric believed to increase support for terrorist groups. It also involved efforts to develop international agreements on counterterrorism, and convince Muslim states to comply with them. And, especially after 9/11, it encompassed US international actions intended to actively combat terrorist threats, such as the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq.

US counterterrorism efforts and transnational terrorist threats gradually took on a religious, specifically Islamic, salience over time. Early terrorist threats—like the Red Brigades in Europe and various Palestinian groups—were leftist and nationalist in nature; beginning in the 1980s, though, explicitly Islamic groups became prominent, with the rise of Hizballah in Lebanon and Hamas in Israel-Palestine (Hoffman 2006). After the 1991 Gulf War, this expanded with the emergence of al-Qaeda as a transnational force and insurgencies by Islamic groups in Algeria, Egypt, Indonesia, Russia, and other countries (Kepel 2002, Gunaratna 2003, Coll 2004, Gerges 2005, Hoffman 2006, Wright 2006). After the 9/11 attack, al-Qaeda became the
dominant focus of US counterterrorism efforts, and the United States expanded efforts to combat what it saw as extreme Islamic groups and support “moderate” alternatives (Commission 2004, Bergen 2011).

Counterterrorism efforts increasingly became religiously-contentious as they grew more closely connected to Islam. Al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Ladin drew on worldwide Muslim solidarity in opposition to the 1980’s Soviet invasion of Afghanistan to gain international support. After the 9/11 attacks, al-Qaeda and its supporters framed the US invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq as attacks on Muslims, drawing fighters to those conflicts from around the world (Bergen 2011). And even the vast majority of Muslims who opposed the violent activities of al-Qaeda and other groups became concerned about counterterrorism activities, due to the perceived profiling of Muslims as potential terrorists and non-Muslim calls to “reform” Islam (Lalami 2012).

Counterterrorism cooperation is high stakes issue for majority-Muslim countries, as they face significant costs by opposing US efforts. Many Muslim states have been aligned with the United States since shortly after World War II, and came to depend on the United States for aid, trade and security. And the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq demonstrated US willingness to take action against states it deemed enablers of terrorism. Not complying with US preferences on an issue the United States deems significant—counterterrorism—thus posed major risks for many Muslim states. At the same time, several Muslim states have faced significant insurgencies, so their counterterrorism policies are of significant import to state survival (Hafez 2003; Juergensmeyer 2008; Kepel 2004; Schanzer 2005). Likewise, most Muslim states have

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9 Of course, not all opposition to US Counterterrorism initiatives was among Muslims, or even religious Muslims, but perception of and contention over this issue often took on a religious tone. For a discussion of the religious and non-religious elements of specifically Arab opinions of US international actions, see (Lynch 2007).
dealt with widespread religious contention (Esposito 1998; Owen 2010; Roy 1994; Roy 2004). As a result, their survival is also dependent on not upsetting religious groups through close counterterrorism cooperation with the United States. The United States therefore sets the terms of counterterrorism cooperation with Muslim states due to its superior power; Muslim states must balance pressure from the United States with domestic opposition when deciding whether to comply with US counterterrorism preferences.

These overlapping dynamics—religious opposition combined with significant pressure from the United States to follow its preferences—resulted in a great variety of levels of cooperation with the United States. Some states—such as Turkey and Egypt, both of which have long-running campaigns against militant groups in their territories—worked very closely with the United States on counterterrorism both before and after 9/11. Others initially had low levels of cooperation, but this increased in response to US pressure following 9/11, such as the United Arab Emirates’ efforts to control terrorist financing after 9/11. And many others hesitated in response to US counterterrorism initiatives, unwilling to take action that would provoke a backlash among domestic groups and militants. This includes Pakistan, which has played a major part in US counterterrorism initiatives but has also experienced recurrent tensions with that state over its failure to take stronger actions against militants. (See Figure 2)

[Figure 2 about here]

Religious contention and Religion-State Connections

US-counterterrorism efforts took place in the context of widespread religious-secular contention in Muslim countries. Religious contention has been increasing in prominence among Muslim countries since the end of World War II, resulting in tension between religious groups and secular states and societal actors (Juergensmeyer 1993, Esposito 1998). And while there is
significant variety to religious politics among Muslim countries, there was some commonality in the effects of religious contention on politics in Muslim societies. Religious symbols and rhetoric have become more prominent in numerous countries’ politics (Eickelman and Piscatori 1996, Esposito 1998, Anderson and Gonzales-Quijano 2004, Eickelman and Salvatore 2004). Religious contention has also resulted in an increase in pressure on Muslim states, and the adoption of religious policies by many of them (Piscatori 1983, Nasr 2001, Bronson 2006, Nasr 2006). And transnational influences on Muslim states’ policies have intensified. Religious contention leads to greater identification with coreligionists abroad, as well as international religious issues, leading to pressure on states to take action in response to events outside their borders. This occurred at the expense of secular belief systems, like leftism and nationalism.

This contention occurred, however, among greatly varying relationships between religion and state. There are some strong states with high religion-state connections. This includes Saudi Arabia, which is officially Islamic with ties between the regime and conservative Islamic groups and extensive restrictions on religious activity; at the same time, the state’s economic resources and powerful security services allow it to act even in the face of domestic opposition. Weak states with high religion-state connections also exist. One such is Pakistan, which developed strong political ties to Islamic groups, official appeals to Islam and restrictions on religious practice over time; the state, however, is relatively weak in the face of societal contention, with political leaders facing pressure from both the military and powerful domestic interest groups. Weak states with low religion-state connections also exist, such as democratic Turkey; this state is officially secular but the democratic process has given domestic groups some influence over state behavior. Finally, there are strong states with low religion-state connections; this includes
pre-Arab Spring Egypt, which adopted some trappings of an Islamic state but maintains strict control over religious practice and domestic political activity in general.

**Religion-State Connections and US-Muslim Counterterrorism Cooperation**

Thus, the increased religious contention in Muslim countries in the latter half to the 20th century resulted in intensified pressure on Muslim states to base their domestic and foreign policies on religious sentiment. Looking specifically at US-Muslim counterterrorism cooperation, I argue that closer relationships between religion and state translate into lessened counterterrorism cooperation with the United States. As was noted above, religious contention in Muslim states involves pressure on the states to adopt policies in line with religious sentiment, and opposition to policies against religious sentiment. US counterterrorism efforts have taken on a religious salience among Muslims, as they are seen as an attack on Muslim societies or even Islam itself. As a result, religious groups pressuring leaders to act according to Islamic standards will also push regimes to oppose US counterterrorism efforts.

The strongest effects are in weak states with extensive religion-state connections, like Pakistan. These states have provisions for Islam as the official religion, and often base some or all of the legal code on Islam. They also restrict religious activity, both by non-Muslim minority groups and Muslims, by enforcing an official form of Islam. And there are significant political ties between regimes and religious groups, including participation of Islamic parties in governing coalitions, the use of religious groups by the regime to administer the state, and state support for Islamic activities. Moreover, these countries have unsteady nondemocratic states, or alternate between democratic and nondemocratic regimes; they also often lack the capacity to control society (Nasr 2001, Haqqani 2005). As a result, they face intense pressure from religious groups to oppose US counterterrorism efforts and not cooperate with the United States; due to the
political influence of religious issues and groups, these states will have the lowest level of cooperation with the United States.

The next highest effects are in strong states with extensive religion-state connections, like Saudi Arabia. These states are officially Islamic, and base their legal code on Islam. They also widely restrict religious practice, to both control Islamic activity and minimize the visibility of non-Muslim communities. And the regimes are tied to Islamic groups, with an official role for clerics in validating state activities and enforcing laws. Unlike the above category, however, these states are rather strong, with extensive capabilities to repress and co-opt opposition (Bronson 2006). These states will also face intense religious contention, but will be better able to ignore some of it and thus have greater cooperation with the United States. A related category are states like Qatar and the United Arab Emirates; strong states with extensive religion-state connections, although lacking the political ties between the regime and religious groups found in states like Saudi Arabia. Due to this lack of political ties, these states will be better able to ignore religious opposition and cooperate more greatly with the United States on counterterrorism.

Lesser effects are present in weak states with few religion-state connections, such as Turkey. These states are officially secular, and either limit the public role of Islam or do not actively support Islamic groups. They restrict religious practice, but this is generally in line with their official secularism, rather enforcing a particular interpretation of Islam or preventing non-Muslim groups from operating. At the same time, there are often ties between regimes and religious groups, usually through the relatively democratic political system, which gives religious groups some power through electoral means; likewise, these states are relatively weak due to the democratic political systems (Yavuz 2008, Kuru 2009) These states face pressure from religious groups opposing US counterterrorism efforts, due to the weakness of the state and the
political power of religious groups. But religious groups are not as powerful as in the above categories due to the lack of extensive religion-state connections. These states will thus have higher cooperation with the United States on counterterrorism.

The lowest level of religious influence is in strong states with few religion-state connections. These include secular authoritarian states like Uzbekistan, which restrict activity by Islamic groups and have few ties to Islam. It also includes more opportunistic states like Egypt and Algeria. These states originally held nationalist or leftist ideologies but gradually adopted the trappings of an Islamic state to coopt domestic opposition; at the same time, they severely restricted activities of Islamic groups and limited their access to the political system. They experienced religious contention, and opposition to US counterterrorism efforts, but their greater control over society and lack of ties to religion allow them to ignore this and cooperate closely with the United States. (See Figure 3)

[Figure 3 about here]

Other factors matter as well. State strength will affect counterterrorism cooperation on its own, as weak still will be unable to act against terrorist groups even if they wanted to; likewise, the level of terrorist violence in a country will affect counterterrorism cooperation, either by giving states an incentive to work with the United States or making it more difficult for them to take actions against groups (Byman 2006). And ties to the United States will affect counterterrorism cooperation. States are more likely to cooperate with the United States if they: are allied with the United States, have extensive diplomatic representation with the United States; and have high levels of trade with and aid from the United States. States lacking such ties, or that experienced recent disputes with the United States, would be less likely to cooperate. Yet, none of these other factors completely account for the role of religion-state connections.
This is distinct from alternative explanations, as it points to a mixture of religious and non-religious factors to explain varying levels of counterterrorism cooperation. Essentialist or civilizational arguments would point to the Muslim identity of states as explaining tensions with the United States. Similarly, some may point to different types of Islamic belief, such as Sunni/Shia or Salafist/moderate to explain the differences; likewise, one could point to the meaning-creation and contestation that occurs through religious contention among Muslims, with the ultimate effects on states’ being context-dependent and ungeneralizable. Other explanations would downplay religion’s significance. Some would point to Muslim states’ hedging on counterterrorism cooperation as examples of “soft balancing” against the United States, with states that have had greater tensions with or are less dependent on the United States less likely to cooperate. And other would argue that Muslim states’ counterterrorism policies are purely due to domestic factors, like state capacity or regime type.

**Research Design**

The paper tests this through a mixed-method design, utilizing a quantitative study of counterterrorism cooperation and religion-state connections and case studies of Pakistan and Turkey. This draws on the relative strengths of quantitative and qualitative analyses. Quantitative methods are useful in analyzing correlations between sets of variables and uncovering regularities among a large number of observations, while qualitative methods can identify the presence of mechanisms connecting independent and dependent variables (George and Bennett 2005, Lieberman 2005, Bennett and Elman 2006, Mahoney and Goertz 2006, Collier and Brady 2010).

**Quantitative Analysis**

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10 Additional information on the coding of the independent and dependent variables, the control variables, and robustness checks is available upon request.
Dependent Variable: Counterterrorism Cooperation Index

The dependent variable is an original measure of counterterrorism cooperation, the Counterterrorism Cooperation Index (CTCI). It measures the proportion of cooperative to noncooperative behaviors among Muslim states in response to US counterterrorism efforts, running from -1 to 1. The CTCI is based on 32 indicators of counterterrorism cooperation, which was validated through various mathematical tests. I base the coding on US State Department Counterterrorism Country Reports, which have been released annually since 1996 and provide official US assessments of the level of terrorist activity in each country, state counterterrorism actions, the extent to which states are complying with US and international counterterrorism standards, and the list of states the United States designates as terrorist sponsors.

I calculate the CTCI by creating an additive index that measures the overall level of counterterrorism cooperation, following the above conceptualization. Specific elements of counterterrorism cooperation are either cooperative or non-cooperative, and a state’s overall cooperation arises from the combination of these factors. Cooperative countries have more cooperative actions than non-cooperative ones, while the situation is reversed for noncooperative countries. The CTCI is the difference between the proportion of counterterrorism indicators that are cooperative and the proportion of counterterrorism indicators that are non-cooperative, with countries with no information for a year entered as missing values.

Independent Variable: Religion-State Relationships

The independent variable is an ordinal measure of religion-state connections in Muslim states. As I discuss above, there are six categories of religion-state relationships among Muslim states, based on types of religion-state connections and the strength of the state. I coded each country based on the types of religion-state ties discussed above: official religion, ties to
religious groups, and religious restrictions. I code state strength, in turn, by the stability and openness of a country’s regime. I used a variety of existing data sources to code this variable, including the Pew Forum’s “Global Restrictions on Religion” project, the Religion and State dataset, and the State Department’s International Religious Freedom reports. And I code state strength using Polity IV scores over time, which indicates whether the country is democratic or authoritarian, and how stable the system is. I rank the above categories in increasing order for use in the data analysis as *Religion-State*. This results in a six-level categorical variable; 0 represents the most distant religion-state relationships, and 5 is the closest.

**Control Variables**

I include numerous control variables in the study. Several measure domestic factors, including *Democracy*—a dichotomous measure of democracy based on the Democracy and Dictatorship dataset by Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland (2009)—*Power*, using the *CINC* variable from the Correlates of War dataset, and *Terrorism*, the two-year rolling average of deaths from terrorist attacks, using Global Terrorism Database data. Others address international factors. This includes a formal alliance between the United States and a Muslim state (*Alliance*), a measure of preference similarity between the United States and Muslim states—using Gartzke’s (1998) measure—the total amount of economic and military aid from the United States to the country, the occurrence of a militarized dispute between the United States and the country since 1990, the maximum level of diplomatic representation between the United States and the country, and the amount of trade between the United States and the Muslim state.

**Methods**

I use a time-series regression with year fixed effects to test the relationship between *Religion-State* and the CTCI. The CTCI is a bounded continuous variable, running from -1 to 1.
Few of the predicted values for the observations—using the full model, discussed below—
approach the bounds of the CTCI range so the effect of the bounding may be minimal; moreover,
the robustness checks using an ordinal and dichotomous version of the CTCI can deal with
potential issues arising from the binding. The dataset covers 49 countries with 14 year
observations per country.

I use three main models. Model 1 includes just CTCI and Religion-State, to determine the
effect of Religion-State in the absence of any control variables. Model 2 includes the domestic
control variables, and Model 3 adds the international control variables.\textsuperscript{11}

\textbf{Qualitative Analysis}

The qualitative tests focus on the nature of religious contention in Muslim states, the
historical development of religion-state connections, and what effect they had on Muslim states’
decision-making in response to US pressure on counter-terrorism initiatives.

The cases are Pakistan and Turkey. Both are substantively important countries that have
faced significant—and at times violent—religious contention. They were also aligned with the
United States throughout the time period of this study, and played significant roles in both US
efforts to contain Soviet influence during the Cold War and US counter-terror efforts. And the
cases vary on the explanatory variables and posited historical processes. Pakistan has been
officially Islamic since its founding, although both the official and informal role of Islam in its
politics has increased steadily since the 1960s. The country has also alternated between civilian
and military rule. Turkey, in turn, is officially secular and democratic, although the military has

\textsuperscript{11} I ran numerous robustness checks to account for alternate control variables, model specifications, and measures of
the independent and dependent variables. Further information and results are available upon request.
periodically intervened in the political process; its democracy has gradually consolidated in recent decades, however, and the political significance of religion has increased.\textsuperscript{12}

**Findings**

The results from the quantitative and qualitative analysis indicate that religion-state relations in Muslim states do strongly affect US-Muslim counterterrorism cooperation. *Religion-State* was consistently significant in the quantitative tests. The cases of Pakistan and Turkey demonstrate how religion-state connections influenced the extent to which religious contention affected US-Muslim counterterrorism cooperation.

**Quantitative Findings**

*Religion-State* was highly significant in all models, with a negative relationship to CTCI. This persisted even after the domestic and international control variables were included, indicating that *Religion-State*'s apparent effects on counterterrorism cooperation were not due to other factors. Moreover, *Religion-State*'s coefficient of -0.21 in Model 3 suggests its substantive significance is as great as that of *Diplomatic Representation* in an opposite direction. And these results held up under numerous robustness checks.\textsuperscript{13} (See Table I and Figure 4)

[Figure 4 about here]

[Table I here]

Some of the control variables were significant as well, specifically *Alliance, Diplomatic Representation, Trade, Terrorism* and *US Aid*. *Alliance, Diplomatic Representation, Trade* and *US Aid* were all significant and positive in the models, indicating higher levels of these variables

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\textsuperscript{12} This is an example of case selection using extreme values to highlight the mechanisms underlying a general relationship. While this raises some issues of generalizability, combining the case studies with a large-n study can demonstrate the findings of the case study translate to the broader population. See (Seawright and Gerring 2008)

\textsuperscript{13} Results from robustness checks are available upon request.
increased counterterrorism cooperation. Terrorism was negative, however, so states experiencing more terrorist violence had lower levels of cooperation.

**Case Studies**

The case studies corroborate the findings from the quantitative analysis, and highlight the political dynamics surrounding religion-state relationships. Religious contention, much of it related to US counterterrorism efforts, was widespread in both Pakistan and Turkey. In Pakistan, however this occurred in the context of a close relationship between religion and state, which enhanced the political salience of religious issues and groups, leaving the state hesitant to work too closely with the United States. Turkey’s official secularism, in contrast, insulated the state from religious contention, allowing the government to work closely with the United States on counterterrorism.

**Pakistan**

The United States and Pakistan experienced a tense counter-terrorism relationship from the 1990s until after 9/11. In the 1990s, the United States pressed Pakistan to end its support for Kashmiri militant groups; this intensified after 9/11, and was accompanied by US calls for Pakistan to take action against al-Qaeda and Taliban targets in the country and reform its education system to decrease the appeal of extremists. Pakistan for the most did not comply with US demands. The country did take strong steps against militants in the country and in the border region with Afghanistan, but these were often hesitating and halting steps (Harrison 2009). Pakistani leaders also actively broke with the United States in some areas, with reports of Pakistan’s intelligence service leaking the name of covert CIA officers and maintain ties to some militant groups in Afghanistan (Haqqani 2005, Haider 2010).
Throughout this, Pakistan experienced significant religious-secular contention, with religious groups pushing for greater adherence to religious sentiment on the part of the state. Islamic groups, while not electorally successful, were highly visible in Pakistani politics. For example, there were calls for the state to maintain restrictions on blasphemy after some attempts to change the law following deadly violence in 2010.\(^{14}\) And many religious groups criticized the states’ (albeit halting) cooperation with the United States on counter-terrorism, often trying these critiques to Islam. For example, in 2005 over Musharraf cooperating with the United States, an Islamic figure claimed the state’s counterterrorism policies were “distorting the Islamic identity of Pakistan.”\(^{15}\)

This occurred in the context of a close relationship between religion and the state. Although founded as a putatively secular state, Pakistani leaders increasingly drew on Islam to justify their rule and increased the state’s ties to religion. One part of this was changes to the legal code requiring all laws be in line with Islamic standards. Also, restrictions on specific religious practices were codified, such as blasphemy restrictions and limitations on the ability of Ahmadis. And the state actively supported Islamic groups. The military worked with Islamic parties to limit the influence of leftist groups in politics. And the military began supporting Islamic militants in India to balance that country’s superior military strength.\(^{16}\)

These connections between religion and the state—combined with the weakness of the Pakistani state—increased the political influence of religion. Pakistani leaders were dependent on Islamic groups to stay in power and opposition from such groups could bring down a


\(^{16}\) See (Haqqani 2005)
government. For example, Islamic groups led the movement against Benazir Bhutto’s first term, which precipitated her removal from power by the military; likewise, her successor, Nawaz Sharif, frequently appealed to these groups to maintain his governing coalition. And religious issues became very salient in Pakistani society, as seen in the increase in sectarian violence in the country in the 1980s (Haqqani 2005). Due to these two factors, Pakistani leaders often appealed to Islamic sentiment for political purposes. For example, Sharif called the success of the Islamic militants in Kabul a “success of Islam;” he also connected the conflicts in Kashmir and Bosnia, calling for worldwide Muslim solidarity. This continued even after Pervez Musharraf established a military government in 2000, as he cooperated with Islamist parties to undermine his secular opponents.

Pakistan’s minimal cooperation with the United States on counter-terrorism was connected to these domestic religious dynamics. Pakistan relied on Islamic militants to balance India’s superior military strength, and support for these groups was very popular in Pakistan, making it costly for leaders to give in to US demands. Also, the Pakistani military opposed taking strong action against the Taliban in Afghanistan, limiting Pakistani leaders’ ability to move against the group following 9/11. Pakistani leaders were likewise wary of moving too strongly against either al-Qaeda or extremist voices in the country, due to the strong backlash any such efforts created. For example, Musharraf’s fear of losing domestic support and provoking a backlash by Kashmiri militant groups prevented him from taking too many actions against them (Haqqani 2005, Saikal 2009).

\[17\] May 5 92 54 – Pakistan: Sharif: Mujahidin Rule in Kabul Success of Islam; Feb 3 93 70-71 – Pakistan: Sharif speaks of Muslim Plight in India, Bosnia. Accessed through World News Connection.
Other factors contributed to this as well, of course, but they do not undermine the importance of the religion-state relationship. Tensions with India drove Pakistan’s foreign policy throughout its history, but these tensions did not require Pakistan to support Islamic causes; this specific policy outcome arose through the religion-state relationship in Pakistan. Also, the weakness of the Pakistani state and interest in maintaining ties to Islamic militant groups made leaders hesitant to fully cooperate with the United States, but both of these are related to the broader religion-state relationship. And the United States did demand a lot from Pakistan on counter-terrorism after 9/11, but Pakistan’s hesitation was apparent even before 9/11.

**Turkey**

The United States and Turkey, in contrast, worked closely on counterterrorism both before and after 9/11. Although the United States was critical of Turkey in the early 1990s for its forceful actions against Kurdish separatists, the United States reached out to Turkey to help combat al-Qaeda after that group began targeting the United States. Turkey took numerous actions against al-Qaeda cells in the country, and worked internationally to combat terrorism. Although Turkey did not participate in the US invasion of Iraq, it did contribute troops to the international mission in Afghanistan and allowed the United States to use Turkish territory for logistics and refueling operations in Iraq.

Throughout this, Turkey did experience widespread religious contention. Religious groups pressed the regime to increase the role of religion, and take action in support of international religious causes; for example, there were numerous protests by Islamic groups in the 1990s over the treatment of the Bosnian Muslims.\(^{18}\) And a religiously-oriented political party, the Justice and Development Party (AKP), was elected to power in 2002. But religious

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\(^{18}\) See PP Opposes Sending Troops to Somalia Article, 1992-12-09. Accessed through World News Connection
pressure on the AKP continued, as several Islamic groups attacked the government for working with the United States on counterterrorism.\(^{19}\)

This contention occurred in the context of a distant religion-state relationship, however. Turkey has been officially secular since it was established in the 1920s; the state also limits the political visibility of religious groups and rhetoric, and increasingly controlled religious practice over time. Moreover, the military intervenes in the political process when it believes religious groups are gaining too much power or the state is threatened; this resulted in numerous coups, the most recent of which occurred in 1997.\(^{20}\) And even after the AKP came to power, tensions between secular and religious elements of society continued.

Turkey’s close counterterrorism cooperation with the United States was enabled through this distant religion-state relationship. Although religious groups opposed counterterrorism efforts against al-Qaeda, Turkey’s official secularism insulated the regime from this pressure, and limited its political impacts. Moreover, the secular nature of Turkey’s political system limited the resonance of religious arguments, in contrast to that seen in Pakistan. And the religious groups that did become politically influential, like the AKP, tended to be more moderate than those in other countries.\(^{21}\) When the government wanted to take an action that religious groups would oppose, then—like working with the United States on counterterrorism—they faced few political costs from religious contention.

Other factors certainly mattered, and explained the government’s desire to work with the United States in the first place; they do not undermine the significance of religion-state connections, however. Unlike many other majority-Muslim states, the Turkish state is relatively

\(^{19}\) See Reformists Said to be Groomed by America for Moderate Pro-US Islam in Turkey, 23 Jul 01. Accessed through World News Connection.

\(^{20}\) See (Kuru 2009) Fuller 2008; Dismorr 2008

\(^{21}\) See (Yavuz 2008, Kuru 2009)
strong vis-à-vis society, so religious groups may have had little impact on the state. Yet, public influence over the state had been increasing since the 1980s, and the nature of the state’s control over society is connected to its official secularism. The prominence of Kurdish separatism could also explain the close counterterrorism cooperation. But seeking help against the PKK did not necessarily require the plethora of measures Turkey took counterterrorism, and Turkey remained frustrated with US support on the Kurdish issue until well after 9/11. Or Turkey’s desire to enter the European Union could have influenced its decision to cooperate with the United States on counterterrorism, although it is not clear working closely with the United States would endear Turkey to European audiences. Alternately, the United States and Turkey may have similar goals in the region, and would thus be expected to work together. Yet, Turkey faced some potential political costs to working with the United States, due to the religious opposition. And, as was discussed above, tensions developed after the Cold War, especially once the AKP came to power. The level of Turkey’s counterterrorism cooperation may also be related to what the United States called on Turkey to do. That is, it may be the case that the counterterrorism tasks Turkey undertook after 9/11 were easier to undertake than those by other countries. Yet, the United States requested a significant amount of help from Turkey on counterterrorism.

**Implications**

Thus, states with greater religion-state connections were less likely to be cooperative on counterterrorism with the United States. The quantitative analysis indicates that a closer relationship between religion and state corresponds to lessened cooperation on counterterrorism. This is the case even when alternative domestic factors—like regime type, terrorist violence, and state strength—and international conditions, like various ties to the United States, are taken into
account. And the findings held up under numerous robustness checks, indicating they are not the result of a specific model specification or measurement of the independent or dependent variable.

The case studies provide greater insight into the effect of religion-state connections on US-Muslim counterterrorism cooperation. In Pakistan, religious contention occurred in the context of close ties between religion and state; this intensified the political influence of religious groups, and made it costly for leaders to work with the United States on counterterrorism in the face of religious opposition. In Turkey, in contrast, the officially secular system limited the political power of religious groups. This gave the state freedom of action to implement policies that were religiously-contentious, such as counterterrorism cooperation.

Overall, these findings support the institutional approach to religion and international relations, as they highlight the significance of religion-state relations in channeling religious contention to affect US-Muslim counterterrorism cooperation. Alternative explanations are less effective based on these findings. The diversity among Muslim states belies civilizational explanations. Granted, more nuanced civilizational explanations might allow for variation among Muslim states’ counterterrorism policies but expect those states whose foreign policies are affected by religion to reject all aspects of US counterterrorism initiatives. This was not the case, however, as religion-state connections had little effect on higher stakes military operations. Explanations that point to broader geopolitics, general domestic politics, and economic and diplomatic connections between the United States and Muslim states to explain counterterrorism cooperation found support in these findings. Yet, these non-religious factors did not account for the effect of religion-state connections, so apparent religious influences on Muslim states’ counterterrorism policies cannot be reduced to things like trade or “soft balancing.”

Conclusion
Thus, the institutional approach to religion and international relations can explain the varying effects of religious contention on US-Muslim counterterrorism cooperation. This approach posits that religion will affect states’ counterterrorism cooperation when religious contention occurs in the context of a close religion-state relationship. When a religiously-contentious issue arises—like US counterterrorism initiatives—those states with closer ties to religion and religious groups will be less likely to take action that runs counter to religious sentiment, like working closely with the United States on counterterrorism. Other factors influenced counterterrorism cooperation, but the role of religion-state ties could not be reduced to things like regime type or dependence on the United States.

This provides the field of international relations greater understanding of the role religion can play in international relations, specifically moving the discussing from whether religion matters to the conditions under which it does. Analyzing religion and international relations does not require drawing a direct connection from religious doctrine to political behavior. Moreover, the prevalence of regimes’ political calculations in the face of religious contention, or instances of cases acting in opposition to religious contention, does not mean religion is secondary to non-religious factors. Finally, the intersubjective nature of religious beliefs does not require interpretive approaches or preclude quantitative analysis. Instead, the institutional approach to religion and international relations highlights the significant interaction between religious contention and state institutions to explain how—and when—religion affects state behavior. Studies highlighting the importance of political conditions and state institutions in understanding the effects of religion are likely more accurate than those highlighting only religious beliefs or downplaying religious beliefs in favor of rationalist explanations.
It also presents implications for the study of US alliance dynamics. It supports those studies that highlight the tensions and political struggles that occur within alliances (Christensen and Snyder 1990, Pressman 2008). It also corroborates studies pointing to the role of hierarchy in international relations, especially involving US interactions with other states (Cooley 2005, Nexon and Wright 2007); US counterterrorism efforts involved the exertion of influence over numerous states, with many of them hewing closely to US preferences and even those that resisted in many areas—such as Pakistan—cooperating on some key initiatives. Yet, as some have argued, intense contention over a transnational issue—like counterterrorism cooperation—can undermine such hierarchical relationships, especially when it combines with unsteady political conditions, as in states with close ties to religion (Nexon 2009).

Finally, it can provide insight into the dynamics of political struggles in Muslim countries for policymakers. The backlash the United States faced during its international counterterrorism efforts does not represent “Muslim rage,” but neither can it be prevented through greater outreach to Muslim countries. Instead, it is connected to the convergence of a transnational issue—religious opposition to counterterrorism efforts—and domestic political conditions in Muslim states that are the result of decades-long processes. Diplomatic efforts and development assistance may alleviate some of the effects of domestic opposition, but if international actors hope to undertake broad-ranging initiatives on religiously-contentious issues they must prepare themselves for similar hesitating responses on the part of the states affected as seen during the US “war on terror.”
Table I: Main Models

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>-0.20***</td>
<td>-0.20***</td>
<td>-0.21***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alliance</td>
<td>0.96***</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.16)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US MID</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.10)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diplomatic</td>
<td>0.23***</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Representation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terrorism</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>-0.00**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Affinity</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.13)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.00**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td>-0.12</td>
<td>-0.32*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.09)</td>
<td>(0.11)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power</td>
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<td>-27.57**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(5.69)</td>
<td>(8.07)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US Aid</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.00***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
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<td>0.71***</td>
<td>0.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>(0.16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>419</td>
<td>414</td>
<td>395</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Weak State</th>
<th>Strong State</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>High religion-state</strong></td>
<td>Significant religious influence</td>
<td>Moderate religious influence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>connections</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Low religion-state</strong></td>
<td>Low religious influence</td>
<td>Minimal religious influence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>connections</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 1: Religious Influence over State Foreign Policy

Figure 2: Varying Counterterrorism Cooperation among Muslim Countries

Counterterrorism cooperation is based on the states’ mean Counterterrorism Cooperation Index value for the pre-9/11, circa-9/11, and post-9/11 time periods. See the discussion of the index in the research design section for more information on the variable.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religious Influence</th>
<th>Officially Islamic</th>
<th>Restrictions on religious practice</th>
<th>Regime connected to religious groups</th>
<th>Overall extent of religion-state connections</th>
<th>State Strength</th>
<th>Examples</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strongest</td>
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<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Extensive</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Pakistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Extensive</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Numerous</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Qatar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minimal</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Minimal</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lowest</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Minimal</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Egypt, Uzbekistan</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 3: Categories of Religion-State Relationships Among Muslim States
Figure 4: Coefficient and confidence errors of Religion-State and other variables in Model 3\textsuperscript{23}

\textsuperscript{23} Alliance and Power were removed from the figure as their large coefficients and confidence intervals complicated visual display.
References